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Summary: In every system that strives to achieve free trade, it is necessary to balance  
this  aim  with  the  protection  of  other  values.  Such  balancing  not  only  has  strong  
implications for competitiveness and economic results, but also goes to the very heart of  
national  regulatory  autonomy,  constitutionalism  and  sovereignty.  The  author  first  
discusses the way in which this issue has been dealt with in the EU in the context of  
Article 28 EC, and explains how the ECJ has been changing the scope of the Article as  
well as extending the list of possible justifications for national measures caught by it. The  
paper then turns to an analysis of comparable issues in the WTO. Emphasis is given to 
the  problems  of  comparing  these  two  organisations,  their  mutual  influences  and 
convergence. Finally, the author discusses possible approaches and tests which could  
accommodate free trade as well as the protection of other values.
I. INTRODUCTION
In every system that strives to achieve free trade, it is necessary to balance this 
aim with the protection of other values. Such balancing not only has strong implications 
for competitiveness and economic results,  but  also goes to the very heart  of national 
regulatory autonomy, constitutionalism1 and sovereignty. 
In  the  European  Union  (EU),  difficulties  in  striking  the  appropriate  balance 
between the interests of the internal market, on the one hand, and national regulatory 
autonomy, on the other, have been most visible in the context of Article 28 EC.2 For 
decades the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been trying to determine the precise 
scope of this Article. Its task has in no way been simple, especially since the many factual 
and legal circumstances in which the Article functions are constantly changing, so that 
what was perhaps a good point of balance in the 1970s can no longer be accepted. Thus, 
in  its  constant  search  for  an  appropriate  balance,  the  ECJ  has  been  broadening  and 
narrowing the scope of Article 28, as well as extending the list of possible justifications 
for national measures caught by the Article.  Finding an approach that  would suit  the 
 Tamara  Perišin,  MJur  (Oxon),  Department  for  European  Public  Law,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of 
Zagreb. I owe thanks to Professors Derrick Wyatt, Tamara Ćapeta and Siniša Rodin for their comments on 
earlier drafts, and to those who provided feedback when parts of this paper were presented at the Asser 
College Europe, T.M.C. Asser Institute in The Hague,  and at the 3rd Jean Monnet Module “Advanced 
Issues of European Law” in Dubrovnik.
1 See M. Poiares Maduro, The Constitution of the Global Market, in F. Snyder (ed.), REGIONAL AND GLOBAL 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002.
2 Treaty  Establishing  the  European Community,  hereinafter  EC,  (Nice  consolidated  version)  OJ  2002 
C325/189
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current needs of trade, but which would also accommodate certain national choices, is 
important with regard to legal certainty and the coherence of case law. This is becoming 
even  more  significant  as  the  ECJ seems  to  be  forming  a  uniform approach  towards 
indistinctly  applicable  measures  in  the  area  of  the  movement  of  goods,  services, 
establishment and workers.3 
The Court’s approach to indistinctly applicable measures in the area of goods can 
be systematised into three stages, which will be further elaborated below,4 but the main 
argument in this paper will concern what the Court’s approach should be. The approach 
which I  support,  and which could prevail  in all  the fundamental  freedoms since it  is 
strongly advocated in legal theory and its elements may already be observed in some 
judgements by the ECJ and opinions of the Advocates General, is a test with two criteria: 
the dual burden criterion (or indirect discrimination) and the criterion of market access. 
Regarding the latter criterion, it would have to be determined how serious an obstacle to 
market  access  must  be  in  order  to  be  regarded as  contravening  the  Treaty.  Namely, 
should only measures that completely bar market access be prohibited, or should less 
serious impediments also be considered breaches of Article 28?
In searching for an adequate solution, I consider it useful to look at the way the 
issue  has  been  handled  in  other  comparable  systems,  primarily  the  World  Trade 
Organisation (WTO). The WTO is relevant not only because its provisions on the free 
movement of goods (FMG) can be compared to those in the EU, but also because the EU 
is a member of the WTO. WTO law is a part of the EC legal order, and is hierarchically 
superior to EC secondary legislation.5 Consequently, “the interlocking systems of trade 
law can have a profound effect on many of the most cherished foundations of European 
constitutionalism”,  and  one  cannot  read  cases  concerning  the  EU’s  internal  market 
critically “without a firm grasp of the GATT”.6 Also, one must recognise that the two 
systems have begun to converge and, even though it is not clear to what extent further 
convergence  is  possible,  it  is  certain  that  each  of  them  can  learn  from  the  other’s 
experience.  Namely,  the  WTO,  which  is  now  moving  beyond  the  requirement  of 
discrimination in the free movement of goods, can draw many lessons from the ECJ’s 
case law following Dassonville, while, at the same time, the ECJ, which is still searching 
for an optimal approach to indistinctly applicable measures, seems to be drawing closer 
to the national treatment principle of the GATT. Finally, a comparison of the EU and the 
WTO with regard to the free movement of goods could provide guidance concerning the 
effect  which  the  EU’s  participation  in  the  WTO  might  have  on  the  latter’s  trade 
3 C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165
4 J.  H.  H.  Weiler  distinguishes  5  stages.  J.  H.  H.  Weiler,  Epilogue:  Towards  a  Common  Law  of  
International Trade, in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.),  THE EU,  THE WTO,  AND THE NAFTA – TOWARDS A COMMON 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE?, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.
5 C-61/94, Germany v. Commission, [1996] ECR I-3989. For a detailed analysis of the relationship between 
WTO law and the EC legal order, see F. Snyder, The Gatekeepers: The European Courts and WTO Law, 
CLMRev. 40, 2003, p. 313-367
6 J. H. H. Weiler, Cain and Abel – Convergence and Divergence in International Trade Law, in THE EU, 
THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA, (n. 4), p. 3
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liberalisation and regulatory values7 (which have been particularly controversial in the 
environmental sphere).
1. Introductory remarks on comparing the WTO and the EU 
When comparing the rules on free movement of goods in the EU and the WTO, 
one should not lose sight of the fact that these two systems have a different purpose, that 
they  are  composed  of  quite  different  constituencies,  and  that  they  have  undergone 
different developments. 
The goals of the EU were from the outset (i.e. from the EC) far more ambitious 
than those of the GATT. For while the goal of the GATT was to liberalise trade in goods, 
trade  liberalisation  in  the  EU was  followed by  a  far-reaching programme of  market 
integration  and  harmonisation,  not  just  in  the  area  of  goods  but  also  in  services, 
establishment, workers and capital, all leading to the establishment of a single market 
and, later, even to the creation of a monetary union. European law represents a new legal 
order.8 The integration process in Europe includes political and constitutional integration, 
and has always been accompanied by broader considerations. In the beginning, this was 
primarily a desire to secure peace,9 and, furthermore, even the original Treaty contained 
several social provisions. Nowadays, the EU aims to be a “social market economy”,10 and 
its  human side  is  reflected  in  its  protection  of  human  rights,  in  the  social,  cultural, 
environmental and other values it supports, and in European citizenship.
Even though the “world trade system” cannot approach the level of integration 
achieved  in  the  EU,  the  two  systems  became  more  similar  when  the  World  Trade 
Organisation  was  established following  the  Uruguay round of  negotiations.  The  first 
reason for this was that the WTO’s new mechanism of settling disputes changed “the 
rules and the legal culture concerning the adjudication and enforcement of obligations”.11 
Secondly,  the  world  trade  system  has  moved  beyond  mere  liberalisation  of  trade  in 
goods,  such  that  the  WTO now  also  covers  agreements  on  services  and  intellectual 
property. Finally, there has been great change in the rules governing the free movement 
of goods. This last point will be further analysed below.
2. World trade v. regional trade
7 S. Dillon, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002, 
p. 2/3.
8 The idea that WTO law should have a direct effect was rejected during the Uruguay round, while the fact 
that it does not have such an effect was confirmed by the Panel in United States – Sections 301-310 of the  
Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R para. 7.72. For more on this, see F. Snyder, (n. 5).
9 Dillon, (n. 7), p. 21.
10 Art. I-3 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 310/11 and Final Report of Working  
Group XI on Social Europe, CONV 516/1/03, REV 1, 4 February 2003.
11 Weiler, (n. 4), p. 3.
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The GATT system and the WTO have economic advantages deriving from the 
fact that they contribute to worldwide trade liberalisation, which can only be achieved 
through subsequent rounds of multilateral negotiation. Namely, multilateral negotiations 
are an optimal way of tackling the problem of the prisoners’ dilemma, which otherwise 
prevents  states  from unilaterally  liberalising  trade.12 However,  the  extent  of  possible 
integration within the WTO is limited by the number and diversity of its members, and 
this is the reason for deeper integration within regional trading blocs.
Regional trading blocs (RTBs) present an exception to the GATT principle of 
most-favoured nation status, which is permissible under the conditions set forth in Article 
XXIV. RTBs, in the form of either a free-trade area or a customs union, enable better 
allocation of resources within the bloc, and allow other common goals of its members to 
be achieved. It is often stressed that regional blocs necessarily create disadvantages for 
other parties to the GATT, because they lead to trade diversion “in the sense that lower-
cost  producers  outside  the  regional  trading  blocs  are  discriminated  against”.  This 
consequently  causes  less  efficient  global  allocation  of  resources  and  reduces  global 
welfare.13 However,  many argue that this has been overstated,  and that extra-regional 
trade remains important for all regions.14
The question one might ask is why all countries do not enter into these tighter 
forms of integration, as well as why all regional trading blocs are not integrated as tightly 
as the EU, as this would benefit them economically? Trebilcock and Howse argue that 
tighter integration requires either centralised policy-making institutions or a hegemonic 
state, and that each of these options amounts to a certain loss of sovereignty, which most 
states are not ready to accept.15 The situation in Europe was specific, and it was easier for 
EU Member  States  to  accept  competences  being conferred upon a  central  institution 
because  the  EU  was,  and  remains,  relatively  homogeneous.  To  a  certain  extent,  its 
Member  States  share  a  common  history  and  common  values,  and  there  were  no 
insurmountable differences in terms of their economic strength.
 
3. Scope of this paper
For the purposes of this paper, national measures affecting imports will be divided 
into  two  categories,  i.e.  those  of  pecuniary  and  those  of  non-pecuniary  nature.  The 
following analysis will focus on non-pecuniary measures, i.e. quantitative restrictions and 
measures having an equivalent effect, whereas pecuniary measures such as customs and 
taxes will not be discussed in detail.
In the EU, quantitative restrictions on imports of goods are regulated by Articles 
28 and 30 -  the former  prohibits  quantitative  restrictions and measures  of  equivalent 
effect, while the latter provides exceptions to this general rule. As is well known, the ECJ 
12 M.J. Trebilcock and R. Howse, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE , 2nd edition, Routledge, London – 
New York, 2001, p. 7/8, 130.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 131. 
15 Ibid., p. 129, 133.
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extended  the  list  of  possible  justifications  beyond  Art.  30,  introducing  mandatory 
requirements16 which  Member  States  can  invoke  in  order  to  save  their  indistinctly 
applicable measures. The case law on the scope of Art. 28, on the one hand, and that on 
the scope of Art. 30 and permissible mandatory requirements,  on the other, are inter-
connected,  and can best  be understood as  parts  of  a  single  whole.  However,  for  the 
purpose of more detailed academic analysis, it will be useful to address them separately. 
This paper will deal only with the scope of Article 28, which is an issue logically 
prior to the list of exceptions to Art. 28. Namely, it is first necessary to establish the rule, 
i.e. what type of national measures fall within the scope of Article 28, and only then can 
one go into the exceptions to this rule, i.e. justifications. Unfortunately, there is still no 
certainty in the EU concerning what exactly this rule is (though a number of scholars 
have proposed what it should be). Thus, determining the rule before going any further in 
its analysis is the correct methodology.17 Moreover, this issue can be of great practical 
significance in determining the outcome of litigation18 and delimiting the workload for 
national judges deciding concrete cases. Their task will be much clearer if they can rely 
on a well-defined scope of Art. 28 and know which measures are not caught by it, rather 
than having to search for a justification that would be applicable in a given case. This is 
especially true since the list of mandatory requirements is not exhaustive. Consequently, I 
believe that a clear and precise definition of the scope of Art. 28 is of crucial importance 
in allowing national courts to act as European courts. Without it, domestic judges will not 
be able to correctly decide free movement of goods cases on their own, but will have to 
refer a large number of cases to the ECJ.
The present analysis of WTO rules is restricted to those which are comparable 
with Art. 28 EC and to the most relevant developments in this respect.
II. NON-PECUNIARY RESTRICTION ON FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN 
THE EU
Article  28 EC provides that  quantitative  restrictions  on goods imports  and all 
measures having an equivalent effect are prohibited. This broad definition has left the 
Court considerable leeway in its interpretation.19 While it was clear from the outset that 
discriminatory measures  were  caught  by the Article,  the  ECJ also placed indistinctly 
16 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649
17 Weiler, (n. 4), p. 225.
18 Since, for example, a ban on Sunday trading could be allowed as falling outside the scope of the Article; 
however, if it were to fall within its scope, then it might or might not be justified.
19 The Commission gave its standpoint on measures having an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions 
in  its  Directive  70/50  [1970]  OJ  L13/29.  According  to  Article  2  of  the  Directive,  it  covers  distinctly 
applicable  measures  which  hinder  imports,  while  Article  3  prescribes  that  it  “also  covers  measures 
governing the marketing of products... which are equally applicable to domestic and imported products, 
where the restrictive effect of such measures on the free movement of goods exceeds the effects intrinsic to 
trade rules”. However, an argument can be derived from the Preamble to the effect that Article 3 may be 
intended to cover only indirectly discriminatory measures (“Whereas such is the case where imports are 
either precluded or made more difficult or costly than the disposal of domestic production”). D. A. Wyatt 
and A. A. Dashwood, EUROPEAN UNION LAW, 4th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2000, p. 321.
5
For citation please use CYELP, volume 1. More information available at www.cyelp.com
applicable measures within its scope.20 Since then, the main issue has been how to create 
adequate and reasonable limits  to  challenging indistinctly  applicable  measures,  i.e.  to 
determine which types of such measures should fall outside the scope of Article 28.
The Court’s approach towards indistinctly applicable measures may be viewed 
over three stages. In the first stage, Article 28 was considered to cover discriminatory 
national measures; in the second stage, the Court declared that the Article also covered 
indistinctly applicable measures; while the third stage of development was significant for 
creating limits on challenging indistinctly applicable national measures (Keck and Krantz 
line of case law). In each phase, the ECJ tried to rectify the drawbacks of its previous 
approach.  Therefore,  insight  into  this  entire  development  is  indispensable  for 
understanding the issues involved and determining what the optimal approach would be.
1. Bringing non-discriminatory measures within the scope of Article 28
Already in  the  1970s  it  had become clear  that  the  mere  requirement  of  non-
discrimination would not do much to aid the functioning of the internal market, since 
many  non-discriminatory  measures  could  also  present  serious  obstacles  to  intra-
Community trade. The groundbreaking case that brought indistinctly applicable measures 
within  the  scope  of  Article  28  was  Dassonville.21 Although  the  measure  at  stake  in 
Dassonville could be regarded as discriminatory to channels of trade, the Court decided 
to  take  a  more  active  role  in  facilitating  the  internal  market,  and  created  a  broader 
interpretation  of  Article  28 that  placed all  indistinctly  applicable measures  within  its 
scope. Namely, the Court gave an explanation of the concept of “measures having an 
effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions”, stating that these were “all trading rules 
enacted  by  a  Member  State  which  were  capable  of  hindering,  directly  or  indirectly, 
actually or potentially, intra-Community trade”.22  
J. H. H. Weiler argues that Dassonville was “heroic” because it was the first case 
that went beyond the conventional conservative view of a liberal trade regime. Namely, 
the conventional view differentiates between rules on market access and rules on market 
regulation, arguing that the former should be obstacle-based, while the latter require only 
non-discrimination. In contrast, Dassonville created an obstacle-based rule in the area of 
market regulation. This is the reason why Dassonville is regarded as having gone farther 
than Statistical Levy23, its counterpart in the pecuniary area, which remained within the 
conventional theory by setting an obstacle-based rule in the area of market access. Weiler 
further points out that the Dassonville approach had a logical basis in the Treaty itself - 
20 The term “distinctly applicable measure” is used in this paper to describe a measure that is applied 
differently  to  goods,  persons,  services  or  capital  depending  on  their  Member  State  of  origin,  thus 
amounting to discrimination.  Indistinctly applicable measures in their face do not prescribe differential 
treatment, but they may impose either an additional or an equal burden. In the former case, their effect is 
discriminatory  (indirect  discrimination)  even  though  there  need  be  no  discriminatory  or  protectionist 
motive, while in the latter case such measures can be regarded as non-discriminatory.
21 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.
22 Ibid. para. 5.
23 24/68, Commission v. Italy, [1969], ECR 193
6
For citation please use CYELP, volume 1. More information available at www.cyelp.com
while  in  the  pecuniary  area  the  Treaty  differentiated  between  pecuniary  measures 
affecting market access (customs, Art. 25) and those concerning market regulation (taxes, 
Art.  90),  it  did  not  make  such  a  distinction  in  the  non-pecuniary  area.  Thus,  when 
Dassonville applied  an  obstacle-based  approach  to  both  market  access  and  market 
regulation, conflating the two, it did not go beyond the Treaty (Table 1).24 
Table 1 – EC Articles on free movement of goods and their scope
pecuniary area non-pecuniary area
MARKET ACCESS Art. 25 EC 
- all obstacles
MARKET REGULATION Art. 90 EC 
- only discriminatory measures
Art. 28 EC
-  all  obstacles  (Dassonville), 
except for those types excluded 
by the Keck and Krantz line of 
case law (see below)
The effect and implications of the reasoning in  Dassonville only became clear 
following  Cassis de Dijon.25 In  Cassis  the ECJ began by saying that, in the absence of 
common  rules,  Member  States  were  free  to  regulate,  and  held  that  “obstacles  to 
movement  within  the  Community  resulting  from  disparities  between  national  laws 
relating to the marketing of the products in question must be accepted in so far as those 
provisions  may  be  recognized  as  being  necessary  in  order  to  satisfy  mandatory 
requirements”.26 This is the core of the principle of  mutual recognition  (or “functional 
parallelism”, as Weiler calls it27), which guarantees that a product lawfully produced and 
marketed in one Member State can be introduced into any other Member State.
Cassis represented  an  important  step  forward  from  Dassonville,  because  its 
principle of mutual  recognition shifted the  burden of proof to  the traders’  advantage. 
Namely,  if  traders could not import  products lawfully produced and marketed in one 
Member State to another Member State, the onus was no longer on them to prove that the 
measure in question was a restriction in the meaning of Article 28. On the contrary, it was 
on the Member State of destination to prove that the restriction was justified. This was a 
“radical shift of emphasis in favour of free trade”,28 without which there would be serious 
disturbances in the internal market.  Namely, products from a Member State with less 
regulated production and marketing would have been disabled from entering the market 
of a Member State with a higher level of regulation, while products from the latter could 
more  easily  enter  the  former’s  market.  Consequently,  Member  States  would  find 
themselves in a race to regulate in order  to provide competitive  advantages for  their 
producers.  Furthermore, even if  Member States were equally  regulated quantitatively, 
free movement would be prevented if those regulations were not qualitatively identical.29
24 Weiler, (n. 4), p. 205-07.
25 (n. 16)
26 Ibid., para. 8
27 Weiler, (n. 4), p. 219.
28 However, the Cassis reasoning was not a novelty, especially when bearing in mind Directive 70/50. S. 
Weatherill and P. Beaumont, EU LAW, 3rd ed., Penguin Books, London, 1999, p. 568/69.
29 Wyatt and Dashwood, (n. 19), p. 324.
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Cassis also went further than Dassonville in another important respect, that is, by 
introducing  the  concept  of  mandatory  requirements.  Namely,  the  ECJ  was  relatively 
sensitive in balancing states’ interests in protecting certain values with the interests of 
market integration, and saw that it would be unreasonable to treat indistinctly applicable 
measures and discriminatory measures alike. Therefore, it held that the former could be 
justified not only by the derogations listed in Art. 30 EC, but also by other mandatory 
requirements. One could say that, in this way, Cassis actually narrowed the Dassonville 
formula.
It is interesting that the Court was able to decide in Cassis without addressing the 
whole problem of indistinctly applicable measures. Namely, the basis for its judgement 
could have been the fact that a national rule imposed a dual burden on imported products, 
since these had already complied with the requirements of their state of origin. In other 
words,  the  Court  could  have  argued  that  the  national  provision  de  facto indirectly 
discriminated  against  importers.  However,  the  ECJ went  the  other  way,  covering  all 
indistinctly applicable measures by means of Article 28.
Although  the  Court’s  case  law  on  the  reasons  for  prohibiting  indistinctly 
applicable measures is not yet fully settled or clear, it is worthwhile to examine some of 
the reasons that can be observed in cases following Cassis. For example, in Oosthoek’s,30 
which concerned a Dutch law that restricted the offering or giving of products as free 
gifts  within the framework of  a  commercial  activity,  the Court  gave two reasons for 
reviewing indistinctly applicable measures regulating marketing methods. The first was 
that the producer in the case could have been compelled to “adopt advertising or sales 
promotion schemes which differ from one Member State to another”,31 resulting in an 
additional  burden on him. The second reason was that he could have been forced to 
discontinue a scheme that he considered particularly effective (see below in connection to 
Douwe Egberts.
2. Limits to challenging non-discriminatory measures
Soon after the Cassis judgement, it became clear that there should be limits to the 
Court’s control over indistinctly applicable measures. First of all, a flood of cases began 
to overburden the Court, and there was also serious criticism of, and resistance to, the 
possibility that the ECJ might analyse each and every national measure that in some way 
impeded  intra-Community  trade,  e.g.  rules  prohibiting  fire-arms.32 The  difference 
between indistinctly applicable measures in these cases and in Cassis-type ones was that, 
in the former, there existed an equal burden on the marketing of domestic and foreign 
products,  while the latter imposed a dual burden (and indirectly had a discriminatory 
effect). 
30 286/81 Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij BV [1982] ECR 4575
31 Ibid. para. 15.
32 Weatherill and Beaumont, (n. 28), p. 608.
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Case  law  tried  to  “save”  measures  imposing  an  equal  burden  in  three  ways. 
Firstly, it began to extend the list of objective justifications for all indistinctly applicable 
measures;  secondly,  it excluded some measures from the scope of Article 28 because 
their effect on the free movement of goods was “too uncertain and indirect”; and, finally, 
in Keck33 the Court withdrew a whole category of measures from the scope of the Article. 
These three methods of saving indistinctly applicable measures will be analyzed in the 
following paragraphs. 
As far as the first method of limiting Art. 28, i.e. justifying non-discriminatory 
and other indistinctly applicable measures,  it  was noted above that  Cassis  introduced 
other  justifications  additional  to  the  ones  set  forth  in  Article  30.  The  list  of  these 
mandatory requirements  was not  exhaustive,  and the  Court  has  extended it  on many 
occasions. For example, in  Cineteque34 it identified the protection or enhancement of a 
work of art  as a possible objective justification for a law banning the sale or hire of 
videos of films during the first year after their release, while in Torfaen35 the Court added 
protection of national and regional socio-cultural characteristics to the list of mandatory 
requirements.
The cornerstone case for the second method of limiting the scope of Article 28 
was  Krantz, where the Court stated that the possibility that nationals of other Member 
States  might  hesitate  to  sell  goods  on  instalment  to  purchasers  in  the  Netherlands 
(because those goods could be seized by the tax collector if  the purchasers  failed to 
discharge their tax debts) was “too uncertain and indirect to warrant the conclusion that a 
national  provision authorizing such seizure is  liable to hinder trade between Member 
States”.36 It is important to note that  Krantz and other cases which adopted this line of 
reasoning  did  not  concern  “certain  selling  arrangements”  in  the  sense  of  the  Keck 
judgement.37 Thus they saved measures which Keck could not withdraw from the scope 
of Art. 28. Therefore, the ECJ continued to use the formula “too uncertain and indirect” 
even  after  Keck,  as  a  way  of  correcting  the  inadequacies  in  its  Keck jurisprudence; 
moreover, it applied this approach to other areas of free movement (e.g. establishment in 
Semeraro,38 or  workers  in  Graf39).  I  consider  the  Krantz line  of  case  law extremely 
important for finding an optimal approach to Article 28, due to the fact that it entails a 
balancing test (based on proportionality and de minimis assessments, as analysed infra in 
chapter IV).40
33 C-267-8/91 Criminal proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097
34 60/61-84 Cinetheque SA v Federation Nationale des Cinemas Francais [1985] ECR 2605
35 145/88 Torfaen BC v B & Q plc [1989] ECR 3851
36 C-69/88 H Krantz GmbH & Co. v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen and Netherlands State [1990] ECR 
I-0583, para 11
37 C. Barnard, Fitting the Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Persons Jigsaw (2001) 26 ELRev. 35
38 C-418/93 Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v Sindaco del Commune di Erbusco, joined cases, etc. [1996] ECR I-
2975
39 C-190/98 Volker Graf v Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH [2000] ECR I-493
40 This appears contrary to the ECJ’s rejection of the de minimis rule in the context of Art. 28 in joined 
cases 177 and 178/82, Criminal Proceedings against Van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern BV, [1984] ECR 
1797
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The third way of limiting the scope of Article 28, as developed in Keck, has had 
the greatest significance so far. In that case, which concerned a French law prohibiting 
resale  at  a  loss,  the  Court  began its  reasoning by recalling  Cassis and restating  that 
Article  28  includes  “obstacles  to  the  free  movement  of  goods  where  they  are  the 
consequence of applying rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods… 
even  if  those  rules  apply  without  distinction  to  all  products”.41 It  then  continued  to 
develop a new formula, stating that “contrary to what has previously been decided, the 
application to the products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or 
prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, 
actually  or  potentially,  trade  between  Member  States  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Dassonville judgement”.42
The Court did not explain why there was insufficient impact on intra-Community 
trade;43 it  merely stated that this depends upon two conditions. The first was that the 
“provisions apply to all affected traders operating within the national territory”, while the 
second was “that they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of 
domestic products and of those from other Member States”.44 These two conditions were 
of key importance because, should they be fulfilled, a rule on selling arrangements would 
not by nature be such as to prevent access to the market of products from other Member 
States, nor to impede their access more than that of domestic products (para 17).
Keck’s contribution to limiting the scope of Article 28 was that it kept the rules 
on product requirements (Cassis-type) within the Article,  in that they imposed a dual 
burden,  while  at  the  same  time  withdrawing  from the  catch  of  the  Article  rules  on 
“certain  selling  arrangements”  which  presented  an  equal  burden,  and  which  neither 
prevented market access to products from other Member States, nor impeded their access 
more  than  that  of  domestic  products.  The  difference  between  the  two  categories  of 
indistinctly applicable measures distinguished in Keck was also reflected in the burden of  
proof. In the case of rules on product requirements that are always within the scope of 
Article 28,  the onus of proving that  the rules are justified under Article 30 or under 
mandatory requirements is on the Member State. In contrast, in the case of certain selling 
arrangements,  it  is  primarily  up  to  the  party  challenging  the  rule  to  prove  that  it 
discriminates or affects market access in a prohibitive manner, so as to bring it under 
Article 28.  If  this  is  successful,  the  onus probandi then moves to the Member State, 
which must prove that the rule is justified, as in the former case.45 
41 Keck, (n. 33), para. 15.
42 Ibid. para. 16. It is interesting that the Court began the key part of its judgement with “contrary to what 
has previously been decided”, and did not refer to the concrete case law it was overruling. These were, 
surely, the Sunday Trading cases (inter alia Torfaen, supra), but it is possible that there were disagreements 
within the Court itself on the extent of the case law which was supposed to be overruled, such that the issue 
was not explicitly addressed in the judgement.
43 L.W. Gormley, Reasoning Renounced? The Remarkable Judgement, in Keck & Mithouard, 1994, Euro. 
Bus. L. Rev. 63.
44 Keck, (n. 33), para. 16.
45 See Barnard, (n. 37), p. 45.
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Unfortunately,  Keck left many  unclarified issues, one of the most important of 
which was the meaning of selling arrangements, as these could often be very difficult to 
distinguish from product requirements. As Craig and de Búrca point out, it is possible to 
distinguish between static and dynamic selling arrangements.46 While the former, e.g. 
rules relating to the opening hours of shops, do not truly impose any additional burden on 
the movement of products from other Member States, the latter, e.g. advertising rules, can 
have such an effect. Subsequently, rules on dynamic selling arrangements do not meet the 
second condition from Keck, and thus return within the scope of Article 28. This problem 
will  be  discussed  further  in  relation  to  post-Keck advertising  cases  (inter  alia, De 
Agostini47 and Gourmet International48).                          
Weiler argues that the formulation “certain selling arrangements” is inadequate, 
and that the Court’s intent must have been to exclude from the reach of Art. 28 measures 
which may restrict the volume of sales, and hence the volume of sales of products from 
other Member States, yet without barring their access to the market and discriminating 
against  them.  He  points  out  that  there  is  no  reason  to  distinguish  certain  selling 
arrangements from other measures that meet this test, because their effect is the same 
(e.g.  a  ban  on  selling  cigarettes  in  machines,  which  is  a  rule  on  certain  selling 
arrangements, can have the same effect as a ban on smoking in public places).49 
Finally,  it  is  worth  commenting  on  the  reasons that  influenced  the  Court  in 
reaching such a judgement in Keck. The first reason, which was even mentioned by the 
Court itself in its judgement, was the flood of cases that had begun to burden it. It stated 
that, in view of the increasing tendency by traders to invoke Article 3050 as a means of 
challenging any rules whose effect was to limit their commercial freedom, even where 
such rules were not aimed at products from other Member States, the Court considered it 
necessary to re-examine and clarify its case law on this matter.51 However, as Weiler 
notes, if a doctrine is justified on its merits, then one tries to deal with the phenomena 
that gave rise to the increase in case load, rather than change the doctrine. Therefore, it is 
easy to agree that the ECJ’s change of approach was a necessary consequence of the 
changes  that  had occurred since  Dassonville,  i.e.  in  the  socio-political  and economic 
reality in which that doctrine was rooted. 52
It should also be noted that the load of case law reaching the ECJ carried with it a 
threat to the Court’s legitimacy. Namely, in deciding such cases the Court would become 
involved in judging as to the reasonableness of various market regulations, which were 
often  based  on  economic  analyses  that  the  Court  could  and  should  not  reassess. 
46 P. Craig and G. de Búrca,  EU LAW – TEXTS,  CASES AND MATERIALS ,  3rd ed.,  Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2002), p 649.
47 C-34-36/95 KO v De Agostini (Svenska) Forlag AB & TV-Shop i Sverige AB [1997] ECR I-3843
48 C-405/98 KO v Gourmet International Products AB [2001] ECR I-1795
49 Weiler, (n. 4), p. 228.
50 It is interesting how, from the wording of the judgement, it might seem that the Court found traders 
themselves responsible for this flood of cases.
51 Keck (n. 33), para. 14.
52 Weiler, (n. 4), p. 226.
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Furthermore,  such  regulations  inevitably  entailed  a  discretion  in  balancing  public 
interests which should be left to the Member States.53
Another possible reason that has often been stressed in explaining Keck was the 
fact that the Single European Act (SEA)54 amended Article 100a EC (now 95), which 
prescribed the procedure for adopting measures on the approximation of provisions laid 
down by law, regulations, or administrative actions in Member States whose object was 
the establishment and functioning of the internal market.55 After SEA, Article 100a no 
longer  required  unanimity  within  the  Council,  but  rather  a  qualified  majority. 
Consequently,  Community  legislative  action became easier,  and there was no further 
need for  the Court  to  have extensive control  over  non-discriminatory  measures.  This 
seems even more probable when one bears in mind that, in  Cassis, the Court began to 
assume judicial control  over indistinctly applicable measures,  having first  emphasised 
that there were no common rules in the problem area. 
The  ECJ may  have  passed  this  area  into  the  hands  of  legislators,  but  it  also 
narrowed the leeway for Community regulations. After Keck, measures which had been 
caught  by  Art.  28  but  were  justified  ceased  to  be  within  the  reach  of  Community 
legislators. This “more limited form of Community governance” was “very much in the 
Geist of the times”.56
Regardless of what the Court’s original intentions were, that is, even if it initially 
gave up its control over “certain selling arrangements” because Community legislative 
action under Article 95 had become easier, there can be no doubt that it subsequently 
took the direction of disabling specific legislation under Article 95 in this area. Namely, 
in the  Tobacco Advertising judgement,57 the ECJ called into question the Community’s 
competence to harmonise “certain selling arrangements” under Article 95. The Court held 
that Article 95 did not give the Community legislature a general power to regulate, but 
that any measure adopted thereunder must genuinely have as its object the improvement 
of  conditions for  the establishment  and functioning of the internal  market.  Any such 
measure would have to aim at preventing obstacles to trade. 
In the case of “certain selling arrangements”, it could be argued that they did not 
pose obstacles to trade, and that this was exactly the ECJ’s reason for excluding them 
from the scope of Article  28.  Under this presumption,  “certain selling arrangements” 
could not be regulated under Article 95, as their harmonisation would not prevent any 
obstacles to trade. 
However,  the Court did not  say anything of the sort.  The ECJ did not reveal 
whether Article 95 had the same scope regarding the free movement of goods as Article 
28, so that it would be applicable only to barriers to trade caught by the latter. While this 
53 M.  P.  Maduro,  Harmony and Dissonance in  Free Movement in  M. Andenas and W. H.  Roth (eds) 
SERVICES AND FREE MOVEMENT IN EU LAW, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002
54 Single European Act, OJ L 169 29. 6. 1987.
55 S. Weatherill, After Keck: Some Thoughts on How to Clarify the Clarification, (1996) 33 CMLRev. 886.
56 Weiler, (n. 4), p. 228.
57 C-376/98 Germany v European Parliament & Council [2000] ECR I-8419
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remains to be resolved in future cases, in my opinion Art. 95 should be construed more 
broadly than Art. 28.58
It is noteworthy that some rules on selling arrangements, which perhaps could not 
be harmonised as obstacles to the free movement of goods, can have a significant effect 
on the free movement of services or the freedom of establishment and, therefore, could be 
harmonised under Article  95 insofar as they create obstacles to the exercise of those 
freedoms (Gourmet, Pfeiffer).59
3. Post-Keck advertising cases and other selling arrangements
Following Keck, there have been many significant cases applying the concept of 
certain selling arrangements and giving it a clearer meaning. In these cases, the criterion 
of marketing, which was the second condition in Keck (para. 16), as well as the entire test 
of preventing market access or impeding it more for products from other Member States 
than for domestic products (Keck, para. 17), gained more importance. 
Most of these cases arose in the area of national rules on advertising. Among the 
first  was  Hunermund,60 in which  a  national  measure  prohibited  pharmacists  from 
advertising quasi-pharmaceutical  products outside a  pharmacy.  The Court  treated this 
rule  as  falling  within  the  category  of  indistinctly  applicable  measures  on  selling 
arrangements, but in deciding whether the rule was within the scope of Article 28 it did 
not fully examine the two conditions from Keck. That is, the ECJ did not truly assess the 
condition  of  marketing,  wrongly  linking  its  fulfilment  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  first 
condition  of  indistinct  applicability.  It  stated  that  a  rule  “which  applies  without 
distinction as to the origin of the products in question to all pharmacists… does not affect 
the  marketing  of  goods  from other  Member  States  differently  from that  of  domestic 
products”.61 Therefore,  it  concluded that  Article  28 was not  applicable  to the  rule  in 
question. 
This  reasoning was repeated in  Leclerc-Siplec,62 which dealt  with a  refusal  to 
broadcast an advertisement on the distribution of fuel in  Leclerc supermarkets, on the 
grounds that a decree excluded the distribution sector from televised advertising. The 
indistinctly applicable rule on selling arrangements was regarded as outside the scope of 
Article  28,  because  the  Court  declared that  the  two conditions  from  Keck had  been 
58 Concerning the interconnection between Articles 28 and 95, the Court has more recently held that, while 
a measure adopted on the basis of Art. 95 constituted a measure equivalent to a quantitative restriction, it 
was nevertheless justified on grounds of the public health protection provided for in Art. 30. C-210/03, 
Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd v. Secretary of State for Health, judgement of 14 December 
2004.
59 Cf Gourmet (n. 48) and C-255/97 Pfeiffer Grosshandel GmbH v Lowa Warenhandel GmbH [1999] ECR 
I-2835
60 C-292/92 Hunermund v Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wurttemberg [1993] ECR I-6787
61 Ibid., para. 23.
62 C-412/93 Societe d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v TF1 Publicite SA and M6 Publicite SA [1995] 
ECR I-0179
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fulfilled. Once again, it did so without fully examining whether this was really true for 
the condition of marketing. 
By way of contrast, in later cases the ECJ started to examine the conditions from 
Keck more thoroughly.  De Agostini concerned a restriction on using certain marketing 
practices in television advertising for a children's magazine,  skin-care products and a 
detergent.  The  Court  first  relied  on  Leclerc-Siplec,  stating  that  the  rule  in  question 
concerned selling arrangements. It then went on to discuss the conditions laid down in 
Keck, stating that while it was obvious that the first condition had been fulfilled (the rule 
applied to all traders operating within a national territory), it was not so obvious that the 
second condition had been, since “it cannot be excluded that an outright ban, applying in 
one Member State, of a type of promotion for a product which is lawfully sold there 
might have a greater impact on products from other Member States”.63 Consequently, the 
Court recognised the possibility that advertising rules could fall within Article 28. 
The Court went even further with this line of reasoning in Gourmet International, 
which concerned a restriction on the advertising of alcohol in magazines.  The Court, 
having  first  established  that  the  measure  was  indistinctly  applicable  to  selling 
arrangements,  examined  whether  the  two  conditions  from  Keck had  been  met.  It 
concluded that the first had been met, i.e. the measure applied to all traders operating 
within a national territory, while the second condition had not been fulfilled, because “in 
the case of  products  like alcoholic  beverages,  the consumption of  which is  linked to 
traditional social practices and to local habits and customs”, such a national measure “is 
liable to impede access to the market by products from other Member States more than it 
impedes  access  by  domestic  products,  with  which  consumers  are  instantly  more 
familiar”.64 This case went further than De Agostini, because the Court did not just leave 
the national court with the option of deciding whether a rule on selling arrangements was 
within the scope of Article 28, but rather it explicitly stated that such a rule was caught by 
this Article.
In Douwe Egberts,65 Advocate General Geelhoed opined that a distinction should 
be made between the types of rules in  De Agostini and Gourmet, on the one hand, and 
those in Hunermund and Leclerc, on the other. The first type of rules involve an outright 
prohibition, while the latter cover advertising prohibitions that are limited in scale, e.g. 
prohibitions on unsightly advertising,  advertising on public buildings, and advertising 
certain products at certain events. He argued that the latter type of rules do not prevent 
access to the market or commercialisation by other means. These rules “do not seek to 
restrict access to the market and are further removed from marketing as such”.66 
However, the first problem in distinguishing between these two types of rules is 
that the test from para. 17 of Keck requires not only that a rule not prevent market access 
(which is true for Geelhoed’s second category of rules), but also that it not impede market 
access more for imported products than for domestic products. It is not clear that the 
63 De Agostini, (n. 47), para. 42.
64 Gourmet, (n. 48), para. 21.
65 Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in C-239/02 Douwe Egberts, delivered on 11 December 2003.
66 Ibid., para. 73.
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second type of rules would meet this condition. Another problem with the test is that, 
while a rule perhaps does not seek to restrict access to the market, it might still have such 
an effect (which is more relevant that the intention of the rule).
In  Douwe Egberts,67 the Court  followed the  Advocate  General  in  finding that 
national  rules  prohibiting  the  use  of  references  to  slimming  and  to  medical 
recommendations and attestations in the advertising of foodstuffs was contrary to Art. 28. 
It did not address separately all the conditions from  Keck, but rather it referred to its 
previous comparable case law. It repeated that compelling a producer to discontinue an 
advertising scheme which he considers particularly effective may constitute an obstacle 
to importers (Oosthoek’s, supra), and that an absolute prohibition on advertising product 
characteristics impedes market access for products from other Member States more than 
for  domestic  products,  with  which  consumers  are  more  familiar  (Gourmet,  supra). 
Consequently, Community law would not allow the rules in question to be applied to 
imported products, while there was no such protection for domestic products. 
It  is  important  to  stress  that,  in  order  for  a  measure  to  be  considered 
discriminatory or protective, “it is not necessary for it to have the effect of favouring 
national products as a whole or of placing only imported products at a disadvantage and 
not national products”.68 Thus it is irrelevant that the sale of products from other parts of 
a national territory is also affected. This was emphasised in Heimdienst, where a national 
rule limited sales on rounds by making them dependent on a permanent establishment in 
a  specified  district.  This  rule  was  indistinctly  applicable  and  concerned  selling 
arrangements, but it did not meet the second condition from Keck, i.e. it did not affect in 
the same manner the marketing of domestic products and that of products from other 
Member States. Similar reasoning was later applied in DocMorris.69
III. NON-PECUNIARY RESTRICTIONS ON FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN 
THE WTO
There are two main provisions in the GATT whose function can be compared to 
that  of  Article  28  EC:  namely,  Article  XI  and  Article  III.  Article  XI  proscribes 
prohibitions or  restrictions on the  importation  and exportation (or  sale for  export)  of 
goods between contracting parties, “other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether 
made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures”. Article III 
interacts with Art. XI in that it requires like imported and domestic products to be treated 
equally  or,  in  other  words,  forbids  various national  measures  from being “applied to 
domestic and imported products so as to afford protection to domestic production”. 
An interpretative note to Article III serves to draw the line between Articles III 
and XI by providing that an internal tax or charge, or any law, regulation or requirement 
67 C-239/02 Douwe Egberts, judgement of 15 July 2004.
68 C-254/98 Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb v TK-Heimdienst Sass GmbH [2000] ECR I-151, 
para. 27
69 C-322/01,  Deutscher Apothekverband eV v. 0800 DocMorris NV, Jacques Waterval, judgement of 11 
December 2003, para 74.
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under Art. III (1) which applies to like imported and domestic products, is subject to the 
provisions of Art. III even when enforced, in the case of imported products, at the time or 
point  of  their  importation.  Therefore,  a  measure  enforced  at  the  time  or  point  of 
importation should first be analysed under Article III and, should it be established that the 
measure does not fall within this Article, then it automatically falls within Art. XI (but 
may be justified under other GATT provisions).70
Similar to Art. 30 EC, Art. XX GATT provides an exhaustive list of justifications 
for national measures that are deemed contrary to other GATT provisions. This paper will 
consider below whether the WTO allows other justifications not explicitly mentioned in 
its agreements.
While for a long time the world trade system required only the non-discriminatory 
treatment of imported products, since the establishment of the WTO it seems that the 
system is moving towards an obstacle-based approach to the free movement of goods. As 
G. de Búrca notes, there are three elements whereby the free movement of goods has 
gone beyond pure non-discrimination. Firstly, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (hereinafter, TBTA or TBT Agreement) and the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary  and Phytosanitary  Measures  (hereinafter,  SPSA or  SPS Agreement)  prohibit 
certain forms of non-discriminatory barriers to trade, as can also be seen from the Beef  
Hormones case (below). Secondly, there is an “increasing subtlety” in determining “like 
products” under Article III, and it is on this basis that a measure which does not have a 
discriminatory purpose may be found in breach of the GATT. Finally, as the concept of 
discrimination has become more “complex, expansive and fluid”, it cannot easily be used 
to  restrict  the  scope  of  trade  liberalisation.71 These  issues  will  be  analysed  in  the 
following chapters, albeit in reverse order.
1. Complexity of the concept of discrimination
One of the most striking pre-WTO cases in which we see how blurry the line is 
between the mere requirement of non-discrimination, on the one hand, and dealing with 
all obstacles to trade, on the other, is Tuna/Dolphin. The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection 
Act (MMPA) prescribed tuna harvesting in a specified “dolphin-friendly” manner, and 
prohibited the importation of tuna which was not harvested in the specified manner until 
the country of origin could prove that its programme of marine mammal protection and 
its average rate of the incidental taking of such mammals were comparable to those of the 
U.S. 
70 This sequence of application of Articles III and XI can be seen in the Tuna /Dolphin cases. United States  
Restrictions  on  Imports  of  Tuna 30  ILM  (1992)  1598  (Tuna/Dolphin  I)  and  33  ILM  839  (1994) 
(Tuna/Dolphin II).
71 De Búrca, Unpacking the Concept of Discrimination in EC and International Trade Law, in C. Barnard 
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The Panel  examined whether  the  MMPA could  be  categorised as  an  internal 
regulation covered by Art. III or a restriction under Art. XI: “The structure of the GATT 
is arguably such that measures which comply with Art. III are ‘saved’ and will not fall for 
consideration under the GATT Article XI prohibition of quantitative restrictions”.72 In 
contrast, if a measure does not comply with Art. III, it is a restriction under Art. XI, and 
as such it has to be justified by one of the justifications listed in Art. XX.
The Panel noted that both Art. III:1 and Art. III:4, as well as the interpretative 
note to Art. III, refer only to “products”, and that the rules of the MMPA could not be 
regarded as applying to tuna products as such. Consequently, the MMPA and measures 
on process or production methods in general were considered outside the scope of Art. 
III, and thus were caught by Art. XI. As a measure caught by Art. XI, the MMPA had to 
be justified by the derogations provided in Art. XX. However, the U.S. did not succeed in 
persuading the Panel, and the MMPA was found contrary to the GATT.
Concerning the concept of “like products”, which is important for understanding 
how measures that many consider non-discriminatory can breach Art. III, the Panel stated 
that even if the MMPA were regarded as falling within Article III, the U.S. would still be 
in breach of Art III:4. Namely, it considered that “regulations governing the taking of 
dolphins incidental to the taking of tuna could not possibly affect tuna as a product”, and 
so “dolphin-unfriendly” tuna was not a different product than dolphin-friendly tuna.  
I disagree with the Panel, in respect of both its conclusion that Art. III does not 
cover PPMs and its test for determining whether products are like. While the issue of 
“like products” will be discussed in a separate chapter below, it should be noted here that 
the Panel drew its conclusion that Art. III does not cover PPMs based on the fact that the 
Article repeatedly refers to “products”. However, as Howse and Regan emphasise, “the 
repeated reference to ‘products’ tells us nothing about the product/process distinction. It 
merely  reflects  that  GATT  is  about  trade  in  goods,  not  about  trade  in  services  or 
movement of capital or labour”.73 Furthermore, if one were to accept that Article III does 
not cover process-based measures, this would have unacceptable consequences. For there 
are  many  process-based  measures  (e.g.  process-based  taxes)  that  would  completely 
escape review under the GATT if they were not caught by Art. III, since they could not 
be subsumed under any other GATT provisions.74 Some consider that an interpretation of 
Art. III as covering PPMs would open the door too wide, since every kind of PPM, no 
matter  how  irrational  or  ridiculous,  might  be  permitted.75 However,  this  argument 
becomes invalid if we accept the “aim and effects” test of determining likeness under Art. 
III (see below). It is also worth emphasising here that “process or production method” 
(PPM) is now regulated by the TBT and SPS Agreement, and it will be discussed below, 
72 J. Scott, On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and the WTO, in THE 
EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA, (n. 4), p. 134.
73 R.  Howse,  D.  Regan,  The  Product/Process  Distinction  –  An  Illusory  Basis  for  Disciplining  
“Unilateralism” in Trade Policy, EJIL, vol. 11, no. 2, 2000, p. 254.
74 Ibid.  E.g.  process-based  taxes  which,  unlike  the  measure  at  stake  in  Tuna/Dolphin,  could  not  be 
considered quantitative restrictions.
75 M. Matsushita, T. J. Schoenbaum, P. C. Mavroidis, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION – LAW, PRACTICE, AND 
POLICY, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 464.
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that  the  Appellate  Body (AB)  has  developed tests  for  determining  the  “likeness”  of 
products which go beyond their physical characteristics.
The Panel report in Tuna/Dolphin has never been adopted, as it was blocked by 
the U.S. Thus, a year after the report, the EC initiated new proceedings against the U.S., 
in which the Panel reached the same conclusions as in the previous case (Tuna/Dolphin 
II). A similar case appeared several years later, concerning a US law aimed at preventing 
the incidental capture and drowning of sea turtles by shrimp trawlers (Shrimp/Turtles).76 
Once  again,  the  Panel  regarded  the  US  measure  as  constituting  a  “prohibition  or 
restriction” within the meaning of Art. XI, one not justified by Art. XX.77 These cases 
raised much concern about the balancing of trade liberalisation and regulatory standards 
for environmental and consumer protection. Many feared that trade liberalisation would 
“weaken both their own country’s regulatory standards and those of their nation’s trading 
partners”.78 Namely,  mutual challenges to environmental  and other standards between 
contracting parties would represent a race to the bottom. It was becoming clear that there 
was  a  need  for  some  sort  of  positive  harmonisation  that  could  balance  the  interests 
involved.
2.  Like  products  –  difficulties  in  distinguishing  discriminatory  and  non-
discriminatory measures
As was stated above, one of the means by which the WTO is moving beyond the 
requirement of non-discrimination towards an obstacle-based approach is its increasing 
subtlety in determining “like products” within the meaning of Art. III GATT. This issue 
is  important,  since Art.  III  prescribes that imported products must not be treated less 
favourably than like domestic products, while products which are not like may be treated 
differently. 
This area of WTO law is still very unsettled, and there is great uncertainty for 
member states as they cannot be confident which types  of national  measures  will  be 
considered to be in breach of Art. III. The problem is that the Appellate Body has not 
created a general rule for determining likeness; rather, it considers the issue of whether 
products are like as one to be decided on a case-by-case basis, and regards the “like 
product” concept as similar to an accordion, stretching and contracting depending upon 
the particular legal or factual context in which the issue is being decided.79 Moreover, it 
regards such a decision as always involving the subjective discretion of the decision-
76 United States  –  Import  Prohibitions  on Certain  Shrimp and Shrimp Products,  Report  of  the Panel, 
WT/DS58/R, 15 May 1998 and Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998.
77 The measure was found to constitute unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, and was thus contrary to the chapeau of Art. XX.
78 Trebilcock and Howse, (n. 12), p. 136.
79 Japan – Tax on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS/8,10-11/AB/R, 4 October 
1996, paras. 20-21.
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maker.80 Consequently,  as Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis point out, there are 
four tests for determining whether products are like.81 
Firstly,  with  regard  to  the  first  sentence  of  Art.  III:2,  which  prescribes  that 
imported products shall not be subject to internal taxes and charges in excess of those 
applied to like domestic products (which is comparable to the provision of Art. 90(1) 
EC),  the  Appellate  Body  has  adopted  a  “physical  characteristics”  test.  Secondly, 
regarding the second sentence of  Art.  III:2,  providing that  no contracting party  shall 
otherwise apply internal taxes and charges to imported or domestic products so as to 
afford protection to domestic production (which is comparable to Art. 90 (2) EC), an 
interpretative note provides that “like” in this context means “directly competitive and 
substitutable”. The third test was applied by the AB in EC – Asbestos in the context of 
Art. III:4, which requires that laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal 
sale, purchase, transportation or use of imported products must not be less favourable 
than those affecting domestic products. The Appellate Body stated that the determination 
of likeness under Art. III:4, as derived from Art. III:1, pertains to the nature and extent of 
the  competitive  relationship  between  and  among  products.  The  fourth  test,  which  is 
strongly advocated in legal theory, is the “aim and effects” test that was developed in US 
– Malt Beverages and US – Taxes on Automobiles. This test takes into account the policy 
objective of Art. III:1, that is, it aims to determine whether there is a legitimate regulatory 
purpose in distinguishing between the products at  stake, or whether  the purpose of a 
measure is “to afford protection to domestic production” (aim). The test also looks at the 
market effects of the measure, i.e. whether its effect on the conditions of competition is 
protective. 
2.1. “Aim and effects” test
Hudec argued that the “aim and effects” test, although not yet a finished legal 
standard, brings major improvements to the traditional tests under Article III.82 Namely, 
this test would narrow the scope of measures considered to breach Art. III GATT, in that 
the latter would catch only those measures with a protective aim or effect. Measures 
without  a  protectionist  regulatory  purpose  (e.g.  those  on  environmental  or  consumer 
protection) and without a protectionist effect would not be regarded as breaching Art. III. 
In other words, according to the “aim and effects” test for likeness, products should be 
considered  “like”  if  they  do  not  differ  in  any  respect  relevant  to  an  actual  non-
protectionist policy, and are not in a competitive relationship.83 Consequently, measures 
differentiating between products on the basis of a non-protectionist policy would be in 
accordance with the GATT. 
In this way, the issue of regulatory justification can be examined at the same time 
as  the  issue  of  violation  itself,  in  contrast  to  the  traditional  approach,  which  first 
80 Id. para. 22.
81 Matsushita, Schoenbaum, Mavroidis, (n. 77)
82 R. E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test, 
International Lawyer, Fall 1998
83 See  Regan,  Further  Thoughts  on  the  Role  of  Regulatory  Purpose  under  Article  III  of  the  General  
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Journal of World Trade, 37 (4), 2003, p. 751
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determines that a measure violates Art. III, and then analyses whether it is justified under 
Art. XX. The “aim and effects” approach has opened the way for indistinctly applicable 
measures  to  be  justified  by  any  legitimate  regulatory  purpose,  and  not  only  by  the 
exhaustive list in Art. XX. This improvement also has “the added advantage of bringing 
article III analysis in line with the analytic framework of the new Standards Code and 
SPS Code, both of which had adopted a one-stage test of violation where a question of 
justification is treated simultaneously with the issue of protective trade effects”.84 
However, there are problems in fitting the “aim and effects” test into the text of 
the GATT, especially with regard to the first sentence of Art. III.2. Namely, as the second 
sentence  of  Art.  III.2  explicitly  invokes  the  general  policy  of  Art.  III.1  that  national 
measures should not be applied “so as to afford protection to domestic production” (aim), 
it  is  hard to argue that  this same policy stands behind the first  sentence.  However,  I 
contend that the whole of Art. III has the same general objective as stated in its paragraph 
1; thus there is no obstacle to using the “aim and effects” test in the context of Art. III.2’s 
first sentence.
The second argument against the “aim and effects” test is that it renders Art. XX 
redundant.85 I likewise disagree with this argument, for two reasons. Firstly, the “aim and 
effects”  test  of  determining  likeness under  Art.  III  could  be used to  save only those 
national measures which do not have a protectionist aim and effect. It is difficult to be 
certain about this issue, as the “aim and effects” test is not a finished legal standard; 
however, there might be measures that it would not save. These measures could then be 
justified under Art. XX (if the discrimination caused were not arbitrary or unjustifiable, 
and if there would not be a disguised restriction on international trade). Secondly, Art. 
XX cannot become redundant, as it contains general exceptions. Therefore, it applies not 
only to measures contrary to Art. III, but also to all other provisions of the GATT.
It  appeared that the Appellate Body had rejected the “aim and effects” test in 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages.86 Here it was clear that the test was rejected in the context 
of  the  first  sentence  of  Art.  III:2.  Regarding  the  second  sentence  of  Art.  III.2,  the 
Appellate Body supported the test of “protective application”, which can be considered to 
present an objective analysis of regulatory purpose, while rejecting the “aim” in the sense 
of the actual motivation of legislators and regulators. This rejection of “aim” as the actual 
subjective motivation of legislators was not quite clear, in that most commentators never 
understood the analysis of aim as going beyond an objective purpose.87 
The Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages88 case can be seen as a reaffirmation of 
the “aim and effects” test, as it shed new light on Japan – Alcoholic Beverages. In Chile  
–  Alcohol the  Appellate  Body  stated  that  it  called  for  examination  of  the  design, 
architecture  and  structure  of  a  tax  measure  precisely  to  permit  identification  of  a 
measure’s objectives and purposes. It noted that, in contrast to the subjective intention of 
84 Hudec, (n. 82), p. 628.
85 On both arguments, see Hudec, (n. 82), p. 628/629
86 n. 76
87 See, inter alia, Hudec, Regan (n. 82, 83)
88 Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS/87 and 110/AB/R, 12 January 2000
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legislators, “the purpose or objectives of a Member’s legislature and government as a 
whole” are pertinent “to the extent that they are given objective expression in the statute 
itself”.89 Consequently,  following  Chile  –  Alcohol it  seems  that  the  Appellate  Body 
intends to continue developing the “aim and effects” test.
Regarding the use of the “aim and effects” test under Art. III:4, I agree with D. 
Regan, who says that Art. III:2 – first sentence, Art. III:2 – second sentence, and Art. 
III:4  “have  the  same  general  aim,  specified  in  Article  III:1,  and  they  should  all  be 
interpreted  in the same spirit”.90 Consequently,  I  think that  all  of  the aforementioned 
cases are also relevant  in the context  of  Art.  III:4.  The AB dealt  precisely with this 
provision of the GATT in EC – Bananas and, four years later, in EC – Asbestos. Contrary 
to what it held in the former case, in the latter it stated that interpretation of Art. III:4 
required taking into account the policy of Art. III:1 that measures should not be applied 
“so as to afford protection to domestic production” (aim). 91
It  should  be  stressed  that  the  “aim  and  effects”  approach  has  important 
consequences for distinguishing between measures on products themselves and on the 
process or production method (PPM). As we saw above, PPMs were not regarded as 
falling within the scope of Art. III. However, as the Panel in Tuna/Dolphin noted, even if 
they  were  to  do  so,  traditional  tests  for  determining  likeness  would  not  permit 
differentiation  between products  based on  their  process  or  production  method.  Since 
many PPMs are not directly related to the characteristics of the product,92 it would be 
regarded that products distinguished on the basis of such PPMs are “like” and should be 
treated  equally  (i.e.  it  would  not  allow  differentiation  between  dolphin-friendly  and 
dolphin-unfriendly tuna). Consequently, many measures whose aim and effect were not 
protectionist  would  still  be  considered  in  breach  of  Art.  III  GATT.  I  consider  this 
limitation of national regulatory autonomy in the WTO to be unnecessary. 
A more balanced solution requires two steps. The first is to consider PPMs within 
the scope of Art. III, in accordance with the text of the GATT (supra) The second step 
would be to apply the “aim and effects” test, which would permit origin-neutral process-
based measures. In other words, if a state differentiates between products on the basis of 
a PPM, and there is a legitimate (non-protectionist) purpose for such a differentiation, 
then such national measures would be in accordance with the GATT. On the contrary, 
measures that refer to PPMs but are “country-based” or protectionist in some other way 
would  be  prohibited.  (An  example  of  country-based  PPM  measures  was  that  in 
Tuna/Dolphin prohibiting  the  importation  of  all  tuna  from a  country  which  allowed 
dolphin-unfriendly fishing,  instead of  looking at  the  way in which certain  tuna were 
actually caught.)
89 Ibid, paras. 62, 71
90 D. Regan, (n. 83), p. 739.
91 European  Communities  –  Regime  for  the  Importation,  Sale  and  Distribution  of  Bananas, 
WT/DS27/AB/R, 1997, para 216,  European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, 2001, paras. 93, 98.
92 In  contrast,  there  are  also  PPMs  that  are  directly  related  to  product  characteristics  (e.g.  in  Beef 
Hormones).
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To conclude this analysis of the concept of “like products”, there are, as shown 
above,  several  tests  for  determining  the “likeness” of  products,  and these differ  with 
regard to the GATT provision at stake. As the Appellate Body determines this on a case-
by-case basis, treating the concept of “like products” as an “accordion which stretches 
and squeezes”, it also puts national regulatory autonomy in the role of an accordion. The 
“aim and effects” test, though not yet a finished legal standard, could solve this problem. 
This  test  would  enable  states  to  apply  measures  which  do  not  have  a  protectionist 
regulatory purpose and effect in a way which they consider suitable. As these measures 
would not be in breach of Article III,  there would be no need to justify them under 
limited grounds in Art. XX.
3. Obstacle-based approach following the Uruguay round
In the Uruguay round, two agreements were adopted to address the concern that 
trade liberalisation would lead to the race to the bottom: the TBT Agreement and the SPS 
Agreement.  On  the  one  hand,  they  stress  the  importance  of  national  autonomy  in 
adopting measures for the protection of life or health (and, in the TBT Agreement, certain 
other interests as well). On the other hand, the TBT and SPS Agreements also facilitate 
trade liberalisation, and aim at preventing all unnecessary obstacles to trade, which means 
that they go beyond the requirement of non-discrimination. As this type of deregulation 
could lead to a race to the bottom, these agreements aim to prevent this by encouraging 
the development of international  standards.93 The TBTA and SPSA do not harmonise 
their respective areas, but they do encourage such harmonisation and mutual recognition.
3.1. TBT Agreement
The  TBT  Agreement  provides  that  member  states  shall  ensure  that  technical 
regulations  are  not  prepared,  adopted  or  applied  with  a  view  or  effect  of  creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade, and, further, that technical regulations shall 
not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking into 
account the risks that non-fulfilment would create (Art. 2.2). 94
It  is  clear  from  this  Article  that  the  TBTA  covers  not  only  measures 
discriminating against  imports,  but rather all  types  of obstacles to international  trade. 
These  obstacles  can  be  justified  by  an  open-ended  list  of  “legitimate  objectives”, 
provided they have not been prepared, adopted or applied with a view  (which, in my 
opinion,  means  “with  an  aim”) or  effect  of  creating  unnecessary  obstacles  to  
international trade. The “aim and effects” test in the context of Art. III GATT is to be 
welcomed for bringing analysis of the GATT in line with this approach of the TBTA and 
SPSA.
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The question that arises is whether “legitimate objectives” under Art. 2.2 can be 
used to justify discriminatory measures. Although the solution in concrete cases might be 
the same, regardless of this issue, the question is important from a methodological point 
of  view. Namely,  if  the answer  were negative,  then one would not  have to continue 
deciding on a measure’s justification and proportionality. The result in a concrete case 
might  be  the  same  since,  even  if  we  could  use  legitimate  objectives  to  justify  a 
discriminatory measure, the measure would still probably be considered to be in breach 
of the TBTA. That is, it could not be justified since it would fail the proportionality test: 
“not more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective”.
Art.  2.2  must  be  read  together  with  Art.  2.1,  which  completely  prohibits 
discriminatory measures. Consequently, such measures cannot be justified by the open-
ended possibilities of justification under Art. 2.2. Moreover, the TBTA does not contain 
any provisions for their justification.  Due to this,  discriminatory technical  regulations 
must be dealt with under GATT Art. III and XX (Reformulated Gasoline).95 
Here we can note a parallel with the EU. It was stated above that, when rules on 
the  free  movement  of  goods  in  the  EU  went  beyond  the  requirement  of  non-
discrimination to cover all obstacles to trade, the ECJ then realised that there must be the 
possibility of justifying such measures by interests other than those set forth in Art. 30 
EC.  It  created  an  open-ended  list  of  mandatory  requirements.  Similarly,  “legitimate 
objectives” and “regulatory purpose and effect other than those of creating unnecessary 
obstacles  to trade” in the TBT Agreement  go further  than Art.  XX GATT.96 In both 
systems, discriminatory measures can still be justified only by means of an exhaustive list 
of justifications (Art. 30 EC, Art. XX GATT), although it is noteworthy that many have 
argued against this solution (e.g. Advocate General Jacobs in  PreussenElektra,97 Craig 
and de Búrca98). The difference in approach between the TBTA and the EC is that, in the 
latter  system,  the  question  of  justification  is  not  analysed  together  with  the  issue  of 
violation itself, as in the former, but rather only afterwards. 
There is another way in which the TBTA strives to facilitate free trade, while at 
the same time preserving national regulatory autonomy. Namely, the TBTA encourages 
its members to accept the technical regulations of other members as equivalent (mutual 
recognition, Art. 2.7). Furthermore, it encourages member states to conclude agreements 
on mutual recognition of the results of their conformity assessment procedures (Art. 6.3). 
The European Community “has relied on the TBT Agreement’s encouragement of such 
agreements to extend its mutual recognition activity from the internal sphere (as part of 
its  single  market  programme)  to  its  trade  relations  with  third  countries”,99 and  has 
95 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 20 May 1996. 
See Hudec, (n. 82) p. 644
96 See J. Scott, Mandatory or Imperative Requirements in the EU and the WTO, in C. Barnard and J. Scott 
(eds), THE LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET, UNPACKING PREMISES , (n. 71)
97 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in C-378/98 PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG [2001] ECR I-
2099
98 Craig and de Búrca, (n. 46), p. 661
99 P. Beyon,  Community mutual recognition agreements, technical barriers to trade and the WTO’s most  
favoured nation principle, ELRev., 2003, vol. 28, no. 2, p. 233.
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concluded several mutual recognition agreements (MRA). However, it is clear that the 
mutual recognition principle in the WTO has not yet achieved the importance it has in the 
EU. The mere encouragement of mutual recognition in the WTO does not contribute to 
trade liberalisation as much as the real requirement of mutual recognition in the EU. The 
same is true for the MRAs, since “recognising conformity assessment procedures is much 
less significant than recognising underlying standards”.100 
3.2. SPS Agreement
The SPS Agreement is also designed to tackle not only discrimination, but other 
disguised restrictions on international trade as well. However, such trade liberalisation is 
to be brought into accord with the protection of life and health. 
The  first  way  of  reconciling  these  two  aims  in  the  SPSA is  by  encouraging 
harmonisation  through  international  standards  (Art.  3),  such  that  measures  which 
conform to international  standards are deemed necessary for  the protection of life  or 
health, and are presumed to be consistent with the SPSA and the GATT ‘94. However, 
member states may adopt higher standards under certain conditions. 
Secondly, the SPSA introduces a kind of mutual recognition by providing that 
member states shall accept the SPS measures of other member states as equivalent, even 
if these measures differ from their own or from those used by other member states trading 
in the same product, provided that the exporting member state objectively demonstrates 
to the importing member state that its measures fulfil the latter’s appropriate level of SPS 
protection (Art. 4). 
The first case based on the SPSA was Beef Hormones,101 and it was a particularly 
important one in that the Appellate Body applied an obstacle-based approach for the first 
time,  determining  that  a  non-discriminatory  measure  was  in  violation  of  WTO 
obligations. 
In this case, the Appellate Body, unlike the Panel, found the EC’s ban on the 
importation  of  meat  and meat  products  from cattle  treated with six  specified growth 
hormones to be in accordance with Art. 5.5 SPSA. The Appellate Body read Art. 5.5 in 
the context of Art. 2.3, examining three conditions which had to be cumulatively met in 
order for Art. 5.5 to be breached. The existence of the first element was clear: the EC had 
adopted its own appropriate levels of sanitary protection. The Appellate Body considered 
that  the  second  condition,  i.e.  that  the  levels  of  protection  exhibited  arbitrary  or 
unjustifiable distinctions (concerning differentiation between hormones used for growth 
promotion and carbadox and olaquindox), had also been met. However, the AB found 
that the third element was not present, i.e. that these different levels of protection did not 
100 K. Nikolaïdis, Non-Discriminatory Mutual Recognition: An Oxymoron in the New WTO Lexicon?, in T. 
Cottier and P. C. Mavroidis, eds., P. Blatter, associate ed., REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2000, p. 270.
101 EC  Measures  Concerning  Meat  and  Meat  Products  (Hormones),  Report  of  the  Appellate  Body, 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R of 16 January 1998
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“result  in  discrimination  or  a  disguised  restriction  on  international  trade”.102 The  EC 
measure was judged to be non-discriminatory. 
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body found that Arts. 5.1. and 3.3 SPSA had been 
breached, because the measure was not based on a risk assessment within the meaning of 
Art. 5.1 and 5.2 SPSA. Consequently, in Beef Hormones, the Appellate Body held a non-
discriminatory measure to be in breach of the SPSA.
The Hormones case was, therefore, a step beyond the conventional conservative 
view  of  trade  liberalisation  that  applies  a  discrimination  test  in  the  area  of  market 
regulation (supra), because, as Weiler puts it, “[t]he Hormones case... did not essentially 
turn on denial  of  national  treatment,  but  on a  Dassonville-like complaint  that  a  non-
discriminatory measure to trade was not justified”.103 
Considering the interpretation of the SPSA given by the Appellate Body in Beef 
Hormones,  I  agree  with  Scott  that  the  SPS  Agreement  “rests  upon  an  expanded 
conception  of  the  ‘basic  rule’,  taking  us  beyond  a  discrimination  based approach  to 
international trade, and upon a restrictive interpretation of the exceptions to the rule” 
(being  territorially  restrictive  and  epistemologically  closed  in  privileging  scientific 
rationality).104 In consequence, it is possible that the WTO will soon face a development 
similar to that of the EC following  Dassonville, but hopefully will be able to avoid its 
flaws. 
IV.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS  -  SPECULATING  ON  POSSIBLE 
APPROACHES 
In  my understanding of  the  ECJ’s  case  law on the  free  movement  of  goods, 
following Cassis and Sunday Trading it has primarily aimed at limiting and defining the 
scope of Article 28. Krantz and Keck attest to this. However, in several more recent cases 
in other areas of free movement, the ECJ has extended the scope of the relevant Treaty 
articles more widely than ever before, thus raising doubts as to whether the ECJ actually 
intends to limit the scope of Art. 28. These cases are relevant in the context of the free 
movement  of  goods because there are indications that  case law is moving towards a 
uniform  approach  to  all  fundamental  freedoms.105 One  such  case  in  which  the  ECJ 
extended the reach of a Treaty article was Carpenter.106 Here it was determined that Art. 
49 EC on the free movement of services had been breached by a measure that was merely 
“detrimental”  to  the  conditions  under  which  a  fundamental  freedom is  exercised.  A 
similarly broad understanding of the Treaty may be found in recent case law on the free 
movement of capital, where the ECJ has extended Article 56 to cover measures deterring 
102 Appellate Body report, para. 246
103 Weiler, (n. 4), p. 3
104 J. Scott,  (n. 72), p. 159
105 See Gebhard, (n. 3), para. 37, opinion of Advocate General Elmer in C-189/95 Criminal proceedings  
against Franzén [1997] ECR I-05909, para 62.
106 C-60/00 Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279
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or dissuading the exercise of this fundamental freedom.107 In my opinion, these measures 
are exactly the kind which the  Krantz test of “too uncertain and indirect” effect should 
exclude from the scope of the Treaty. It is worth mentioning here that the Kranz formula 
has already been applied outside the area of goods (e.g. Graf108 for the free movement of 
workers,  Semeraro109 for the freedom of establishment).  The following analysis  of an 
optimal approach to the free movement of goods may perhaps also be applicable to other 
fundamental freedoms.
An optimal approach to Article 28 EC needs to precisely define and delimit the 
scope of the Article so that it would not catch all obstacles to trade.110 This approach 
could be built upon the tests that the ECJ developed in both Krantz and in the Keck line 
of case law. 
The Keck line of case law is useful in constructing an optimal approach because it 
contains two important criteria: one on discrimination, and the other on market access. 
However, as discussed above, the reach of Keck is limited due to the unclear concept of 
“certain selling arrangements”. 
Krantz supplements  Keck by  excluding  from  the  scope  of  Article  28  those 
measures  that  Keck cannot  exclude,  as  they  are  not  rules  on  “certain  selling 
arrangements”,  although  they  have  the  same  effect.  Another  reason  why  I  consider 
Krantz to be important is that its formula of “too uncertain and indirect effect” enables 
better balancing of the values at stake. This is particularly significant with regard to the 
market access criterion, since an optimal approach must define what kind of effect on 
market access is to be considered a breach of the Article. Namely, should only measures 
completely barring market access be prohibited or, on the contrary, should Article 28 
already be triggered if market access is merely hindered? The best solution probably lies 
somewhere  in  between  these  two  options,  and  can  be  determined  via  a  Krantz-type 
proportionality assessment. In my opinion, it is certainly necessary to include measures 
that completely bar market access within the scope of Art. 28, but certain other measures 
that only impede it should also be prohibited. Conversely, I think that measures which 
merely hinder market  access have a “too uncertain and indirect” effect  on trade and, 
therefore, should be placed outside the scope of Article 28.
Certainly, proportionality is not a clear and precise term, and it could be difficult 
to apply it in practice. It is, moreover, probable that a different standard of proportionality 
would be adopted by different national courts. However, it would be for the ECJ to set 
the conditions or guidelines for determining whether a measure impeding market access 
107 C-483/99 Commission  v. France [2002] ECR I-4781, C-503/99 Commission v. Belgium [2002] ECR I-
4809, C-98/01 Commission v. United Kingdom, judgement of 13 May 2003 
108 C-190/98 Volker Graf v Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH [2000] ECR I-493
109 C-418/93 Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v Sindaco del Commune di Erbusco, joined cases, etc. [1996] ECR I-
2975
110 The need for Article 28 to catch all obstacles to trade was certainly removed with the establishment of 
the single market. As Weiler points out, many things had already changed in the EC by then. There was a 
commitment by national administrations to the single market, and protectionism was not as frequent as it 
once was, so that the new approach to Art. 28 had to be more tolerant towards national regulatory diversity, 
as was also the case with the harmonisation programme. Weiler, (n. 4), p.226/227.
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is proportionate. Here another question arises: “Proportionate to what?” There are several 
possible solutions to this. 
The first solution would be to merge analysis of the issue of violation itself with 
that of regulatory justification. This would mean that a measure affecting market access 
must  be  proportionate  to  a  legitimate  aim  (such  as  environmental  or  consumer 
protection). In other words, the question as to whether a measure is caught by Art. 28 
would  be  decided  along  with  its  justification.  It  is  noteworthy  that  this  approach 
resembles the “aim and effects” test under Art. III GATT, which also considers the issue 
of regulatory justification together with the violation itself. However, the purpose of such 
an approach in the WTO is to enable member states to justify indistinctly applicable 
measures which could otherwise not be justified. In contrast, this is not necessary in the 
EU,  as  this  is  achieved through  mandatory  requirements.  Furthermore,  this  approach 
would not tackle the main problems that the ECJ has been trying to solve for decades. 
One of the reasons why the ECJ has tried to restrict the scope to Art. 28 is precisely to 
avoid a situation in which national courts or the ECJ itself have to enter into possible 
justifications of measures in each case where there is an obstacle to trade. 
The second solution is to say that a measure does not have to be proportionate to a 
value, but rather correspond to the fact that there is a lack of harmonisation, and that an 
obstacle  at  stake  exists  solely  because  different  MS  have  different  rules.  As  M.  P. 
Maduro points out (see below), this solution solves the problem of the additional burden 
that often occurs due solely to legislative disparities between MS. Since the concept of 
dual burden is associated with discrimination, the difference between discrimination and 
lack of harmonisation becomes trivial. This solution is actually a de minimis test, and one 
of the problems with such an approach is that the ECJ has already expressly excluded a 
de minimis test for Art. 28.111
This kind of  de minimis  test in respect of market access was developed by AG 
Jacobs in  Leclerc,112 and has been advocated more recently by C. Barnard.113 Barnard 
supports the approach to non-discriminatory measures (in the area of goods and persons) 
defined by “prevention or direct and substantial hindrance of access to the market”.114 
This kind of proportionality assessment would also represent a de minimis rule for the use 
of Article 28.  Further,  Barnard contends that  there is  actually no need for a separate 
criterion  of  discrimination,  since  measures  which  discriminate  necessarily  also 
substantially hinder market access.
Weiler proposes two rules for bringing measures within the scope of the Treaty. 
The general rule should provide that “national provisions which do not affect in the same 
manner, in law or in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other 
Member States, must be justified by a public interest taking precedence over the free 
111 Van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern BV, supra (n. 40)
112 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec (n. 62), para. 49
113 C. Barnard,  THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU – THE FOUR FREEDOMS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2004 and Barnard in op. cit. (n. 37)
114 Barnard (n. 113), p. 144-148
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movement of goods”.115 This is a principle of non-discrimination which Weiler considers 
to be a general principle of Community law. If compared to the GATT, it would then be a 
national treatment principle equally applicable in both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
areas.  The special  rule for  free  movement  should be that  “national  provisions which 
prevent access to the market of imported products must also be justified”.116 This would 
catch non-discriminatory measures that could totally exclude a good from the market.
 
Similarly,  Maduro117 argues that the case law of different free movement rules 
relating to non-discriminatory provisions could be reconciled via two tests.118 The first 
test  is  whether  a  measure  imposes  an additional  burden on  products  (or  services,  or 
nationals)  from other  Member  States,  while  the  second  test  concerns  market  access. 
Regarding  this,  Maduro,  building  upon  Weiler,  argues  that  hindering  market  access 
should not be sufficient for a measure to fall within the scope of the Treaty, such that 
only those measures which bar market access in law or in fact would be caught by it. 
Maduro’s analysis points out the problems with both tests. The problem with the 
first test is that an additional burden often occurs for the sole reason that Member States 
have different rules. Furthermore, since the concept of dual burden is associated with 
discrimination, the difference between discrimination and lack of harmonisation becomes 
trivial. The second test includes absolute bans and measures which do not authorise the 
national market entry of products exactly as they were produced in their market of origin. 
This component of the test brings it close to a double burden test, and to the problems 
discussed in connection therewith. “In the end, underlying the double burden or market 
access tests is a suspicion that national measures of that type are discriminatory since 
they will impose an additional cost on imported products. But such a broad notion of 
discrimination  ends  up  coinciding  with  the  problem  of  legislative  disparities.  The 
question  becomes  whether  the  Court  of  Justice  should  review  all  non-harmonised 
national regulations?”119 This problem could also be handled if the ECJ were to develop 
tools for the application of Krantz-type balancing, as well as for determining exactly what 
constitutes discrimination.
It is noteworthy that the balancing of free trade with other values at stake appears 
in every aspect of analyses of alleged European law violations or WTO rules violations. 
As de Búrca stresses, “this kind of balancing also takes place, albeit in a less explicit or in 
a  more  circumscribed  way,  at  the  stage  of  considering  whether  discrimination  or 
protectionism  exists”.120 Such  balancing  exists  in  the  context  of  Art.  28  EC  (as 
exemplified  in  Walloon  Waste,  where  the  Court  determined  that  the  measure  could 
differentiate between Walloon and other kinds of waste, since they are not like), as well 
115 J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the Evolution of the  
Free Movement of Goods in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.) EVOLUTION OF EU LAW,  Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1999 and Weiler in op. cit. (n. 4), p. 228.
116 Ibid.
117 Maduro, (n. 53)
118 This uniform approach would be based on recent case law in the area of goods (e.g. Franzén for the first 
test and Gourmet for the second).
119 Maduro, (n. 53)
120 De Búrca, (n. 71), p. 192
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as under Art. 90 EC, in determining which products are “similar”, and under Art. 25 EC, 
in determining whether a measure is equivalent to a customs duty.121 
Regarding the approach to the free movement of goods in the WTO, it has already 
been  stated  that  the  WTO  is  moving  beyond  the  requirement  of  non-discrimination 
towards an obstacle-based  approach.  WTO rules  on the  free movement  of  goods are 
catching many non-protectionist national measures, due to, firstly, the imprecise scope of 
Art. III GATT regarding PPMs and, secondly, the understanding of the concept of “like 
products”.  Finally,  the  obstacle  approach  has  been  adopted  by  the  TBT  and  SPS 
Agreements, and confirmed by the Appellate Body in  Beef Hormones. The agreements 
attempt to balance the values at stake and circumvent the dangers of catching too many 
national measures by promoting mutual  recognition and harmonisation,  as well as by 
providing open-ended possibilities of justification.
Some of  the problems occurring could be resolved by applying  the “aim and 
effects” test. It is interesting to compare how balancing the interests of free trade and 
national autonomy would take place in the GATT if it were to completely develop the 
“aim and effects”  test  with  the  situation in  the  EU.  Firstly,  in  both  systems  directly 
discriminatory (protectionist) measures would be prohibited unless justified by a limited 
set  of  explicitly  stated  reasons  (Art.  30  EC,  Art.  XX GATT).  Secondly,  indistinctly 
applicable measures causing a dual burden or indirect discrimination in the EU would be 
caught by Article 28 EC, yet could be justified by Art. 30 or mandatory requirements. In 
the WTO, under the “aim and effects” test, the legitimate objective of such measures 
would be decided under Art. III GATT simultaneously with the issue of violation. (These 
legitimate,  i.e.  non-protectionist  objectives  would  be  open-ended,  as  are  mandatory 
requirements in the EU.) Finally, in the EU indistinctly applicable measures with equal 
burden that represent completely non-discriminatory obstacles to trade are treated in the 
same way as the other category of measures, while it remains to be seen what the solution 
will be in the WTO should it adopt an “obstacle-base approach” in areas other than those 
of the SPS and TBT Agreements.
There are strong mutual influences between the EU and WTO systems of the free 
movement  of  goods.  There  are  certainly  some useful  lessons  to be  learned from the 
development of both, and some principles could perhaps be cross-applied. In defining the 
scope of Art. III and the TBT and SPS Agreements, it would obviously be useful for the 
Appellate Body to draw lessons from the ECJ’s case law post-Dassonville, while taking 
into account the differences between the EC and the WTO. In my opinion, in moving 
beyond discrimination the WTO’s rules on the free movement of goods should certainly 
not become so broad as to catch all obstacles to trade, since even in the EU, which aims 
at a much higher level of integration than the WTO, Art.  28 does not cover all  such 
obstacles. This precise delimitation of Art. III GATT and the TBT and SPS Agreements 
would be highly relevant for the EU, since it is a WTO member. In turn, the EU could 
also  have an  effect  firstly,  on  trade liberalisation  in  the  WTO, and secondly,  on  the 
WTO’s regulatory values, and on the creation of mechanisms enabling the protection of 
interests other than trade. 
121 Ibid.
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Firstly, with regard to the EU’s effect on trade liberalisation, it is possible that the 
internal dynamics of the EU will have a strong external impact, and that it will contribute 
to the creation of trade barriers within the WTO. Namely, there are obstacles to trade in 
the EU which cannot be removed by negative integration (primarily Art. 28 EC), but 
rather require positive integration. Positive integration means the adoption of common 
rules.  “When  common  rules  are  negotiated,  the  government  with  legitimate,  more 
stringent standards is in a strong bargaining position. So long as there is no agreement, its 
industry is protected from foreign competition, while those of its trading partners are hurt 
by being denied access to the market. Consequently, the cost of no-agreement falls more 
heavily on its trading partners. In such circumstances, a negotiated outcome will be closer 
to the preferred position of the government with the stricter regulation”.122 In other words, 
the dynamics of EU harmonisation create regulatory peaks which form an obstacle to 
trade within the WTO. These external influences of the internal market should be taken 
into consideration when deciding on the optimal scope of EC Treaty articles and EC 
common rules.
Secondly, regarding the WTO’s regulatory values and the creation of mechanisms 
which enable the protection of interests other than trade, Weiler predicts that, although 
convergence of the WTO and the EU can only be limited, “[i]t will not be long before the 
WTO Panel and/or Appellate Body will pronounce a WTO version of the doctrine of 
parallel  functionalism  (mutual  recognition)”,  one  whose  legislative  expression  can 
already be found in the TBT and SPS Agreements.123 It is also likely that we will see 
more harmonisation in the WTO in the form of “international standards”. 
122 A. R. Young, Incidental Fortress: The Single European Market and the World Trade, JCMS, 2004, vol. 
42, no. 2, p. 401, 410.
123 Weiler, (n. 4), p. 231.
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